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Article 2

The Flexible Family in Three Dimensions
Thomas P. Gallanist
Introduction
One of the central questions facing American family law
throughout the last quarter century, and continuing today, is how
to respond to the "extraordinary growth in the rate of nonmarital
cohabitation."' Much of this cohabitation has involved partners of
the opposite sex. 2 Some of it has involved partners of the same
sex.3 Some of the couples have been young; some have been old;
others have been at different points on the spectrum. 4 In some
instances, the partners live as a household of two. In other
instances, the household comprises more than two: it may include
children, 5 parents, other relatives, non-relatives, or any
combination. Moreover, cohabitation need not include partners in
the conventional romantic sense. Two or more adults can, and
often do, live together and share lives of deep mutual care and
concern without romantic attachment.
The rise in all of these forms of nonmarital cohabitation has
challenged the predominant paradigm of American family law,
which focuses on marriage. To what extent should there be room
in our law for a family outside marriage-in other words, for what
t. N. William Hines Professor of Law, University of Iowa. It is a pleasure to
thank the University of Iowa Law School and Law Library for research support and
Matthew Van Heuvelen (J.D. expected 2010) for research assistance.
1. Am.LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 31 (2002).

2. In 2000, there were 5,475,768 unmarried-partner households in the United
States-4,881,377 (89.1%) of which consisted of opposite-sex partners. TAVIA
SIMMONS & MARTIN O'CONNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS 2000 SPECIAL
REPORT: MARRIED-COUPLE AND UNMARRIED-PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS: 2000 2 tbl.1

For a discussion of
(2003), http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-5.pdf.
potential problems with Census data on same-sex, unmarried-partner couples, see
Dan Black et al., The Measurement of Same-Sex UnmarriedPartnerCouples in the
2000 Census (Cal. Ctr. for Population Research, Working Paper No. 23, 2007),
available at http://papers.ccpr.ucla.edu/papers/PWP-CCPR-2007-023/PWP-CCPR2007-023.pdf.
3. Of the 5,475,768 unmarried-partner households in the United States in
2000, 594,391 (10.9%) consisted of same-sex partners. SIMMONS & O'CONNELL,
supra note 2, at 2 tbl.1.
4. For data on average ages of cohabitants, see id. at 14 tbl.6.
5. For data on the percentage of unmarried-partner households with children
younger than eighteen years, see id. at 9 tbl.4.
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might be termed the "flexible family"? To what extent should our
law help to organize and support the flexible family? This
Symposium on "Family Values: Law and the Modern American
Family" invites us to consider these questions.
By way of answer, this Essay advances three normative
claims. First, nonmarital cohabitation should be more fully
recognized and supported by American law. Second, given the
mobility of our population from one state to another, the legal
structures that recognize and support the flexible family should be
portable across state lines for parties who change their state of
domicile. Third, American law not only should address the
bilateral, or two-dimensional, rights and obligations of unmarried
cohabitants to each other,6 but also should do more to protect the
flexible family against third parties-hence, in all three
dimensions.
I take these normative claims in order.
I.

Recognition and Support

I begin with the claim that American law should do more to
recognize and support nonmarital cohabitation. 7 As a descriptive
matter, it is fair to say that American law has expressed, at best,
ambivalence about nonmarital cohabitation, even when it tries to
mimic marriage. The landmark "palimony" decision in Marvin v.
Marvin8 is well known for establishing that plaintiff Michelle
Triola could maintain a cause of action for breach of a contract of
support against defendant Lee Marvin 9 with whom she had agreed
to live.10 What is less well-remembered is that, after the case was
remanded for trial, Triola was unable to prove the contract's
existence.) She was awarded damages on an unspecified equitable

6. Cf. AM. LAW INST., supra note 1, at 32 ("Chapter 6 is limited to the following
question: What are the economic rights and responsibilities of the parties to each
other at the termination of their nonmarital cohabitation? Chapter 6 [on domestic
partners] does not create any rights against the government or third parties."
(footnotes omitted)).
7. This section of the Essay draws on LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER, GREGORY S.
ALEXANDER, MARY LOUISE FELLOWS & THOMAS P. GALLANIS, FAMILY PROPERTY
LAW: WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS (4th ed. 2006).

8. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976), appealed after remand, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
9. Id. at 122-23.
10. Id. at 110.
11. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 557.
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theory, but the award was rejected on appeal. 12 She received
13
nothing.
The legal principle of Marvin-that a domestic contract
between nonmarital cohabitants can in theory be enforced, even
when the contract is neither express nor in writing-was accepted
in some states,1 4 and was sometimes even extended from oppositesex to same-sex couples.' 5 But the Marvin principle was rejected in
many states. Some of these states required an express contract,
whether oral or written.1 6 Other states went further, insisting on a
contract in writing.17 And still other states rejected the very idea
that a quasi-marital contract between unmarried cohabitants,
whether of opposite sexes or the same sex, could be enforced at
all.18

If the recognition of the rights of unmarried cohabitants as a
matter of contract has been difficult, so too has the recognition of
their rights as a matter of status. There is, of course, the doctrine
of common-law marriage, currently recognized in ten states and in
the District of Columbia.19 There is also the doctrine of the
putative spouse, recognized in some states. 20 These doctrines are
far from universal and, in any event, apply only to opposite-sex

couples. 21 The doctrines of common-law marriage and the putative

12. Id. at 559.
13. Id. Michelle Triola died on October 30, 2009. Anahad O'Connor, Michelle
Triola Marvin, of Landmark Palimony Suit, Dies at 76, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2009,
at A22.
14. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 113-14.
15. See Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
16. See, e.g., Levar v. Elkins, 604 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1980); Dominguez v. Cruz,
617 P.2d 1322 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980); Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y.
1980).
17. E.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 513.075-513.076 (2008); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 26.01(b)(3) (Vernon 2007).
18. See, e.g., Rehak v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 81 (Ga. 1977). In at least one state, it
is a criminal offense for a man and a woman to cohabit without being married to
each other. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (2006).
19. THOMAS P. GALLANIs, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS (5th ed. forthcoming 2011). The states
recognizing common-law marriage are Alabama, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Montana,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah. Id.
20. For discussion, see Christopher Blakesley, The Putative MarriageDoctrine,
60 TUL. L. REV. 1, 13-18 (1985). See also MODEL MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 209
(1973).
21. A potential exception may be Iowa, which recognizes common-law marriage
and same-sex marriage. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 701-73.25 (2009); see also Varnum v.
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (holding unconstitutional a state statute that
limited civil marriage to a union between a man and a woman, but not addressing
whether the state would or should extend common-law marriage to same-sex
couples).
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spouse aside, neither the case law nor the statutes of most states
provide much recognition or protection for unmarried cohabitants
as a matter of status.
The reluctance to analogize between cohabitation and the
historically protected status of marriage can be seen in one of the
earliest cases involving the right of a same-sex partner to be
treated as enjoying the same status as a legal spouse: the 1989
New York case of Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co. 22 The New York
Court of Appeals held that the surviving gay partner of a deceased
tenant was entitled to the same statutory rent and eviction
protections given to the "surviving spouse.., or some other
member of the deceased tenant's family."23 The key word was
"family." A partner could be considered "family" as in Braschi;
however, the subsequent case of In re Cooper 24 made it clear that
the partner could not fit within the definition of, or have a status
25
analogous to, a "spouse."
During the 1990s, the national discussion on the status of
26
unmarried cohabitants focused heavily, though not exclusively,
on the rights of same-sex partners and whether they would be
granted access to marriage. Prominent events in the 1990s include
the Hawaii Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Baehr v. Lewin, 27 the
signing of the federal Defense of Marriage Act in 1996,28 the
29
Vermont Supreme Court's 1999 decision in Baker v. Vermont,
and the California domestic partnership legislation that came into
30
force on January 1, 2000.
The focus on same-sex couples continued through the first
decade of the current century. Same-sex marriage was a

22. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
23. Id. at 52.
24. 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
25. Id. at 798-99.
26. See, e.g., Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (using
the "meretricious relationship" doctrine to hold that opposite-sex partners have
some of the rights of married couples upon dissolution of the partnership); Goode v.
Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430 (W. Va. 1990) (holding that, even in the absence of a
common-law marriage, a woman could obtain equitable division of property on the
dissolution of her nonmarital opposite-sex partnership).
27. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding that the state's prohibition of same-sex
marriage amounted to discrimination on the basis of sex under the state
constitution).
28. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
29. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (holding that Vermont's existing prohibitions on
same-sex marriage violated the state constitution and ordering the legislature to
either permit same-sex marriage or implement an alternative legal mechanism
ensuring similar rights).
30. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297-297.5 (West 2004).
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prominent issue in the 2004 presidential election 31 and in the 2008
state election in California. 32 Advances during the decade include
the legalization of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, 33
Connecticut, 34 Iowa, 35 Vermont, 36 New Hampshire, 37 the District of
Columbia, 38 and (briefly) California, 39 and the recognition-using a
status other than marriage-of same-sex partnerships in
42
California, 40 the District of Columbia, 41 New Hampshire,
46
Nevada, 43 New Jersey, 44 Oregon, 45 and Washington.
In many cases, the statutory recognition of domestic
partnerships within the United States either has been limited to
same-sex couples 47 or has been extended only to those opposite-sex
couples where at least one partner is elderly. 48 Only in rare

31. See Adam Nagourney, "Moral Values" CarriedBush, Rove Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 2004, at A20; see also James Dao, Same-Sex Marriage Issue Key to Some
G.O.P. Races, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at P4; David D. Kirkpatrick, Marriage
Between Gays Becomes Issue in Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2004, at A16.
32. See Jesse McKinley, Back to the Ramparts in California,N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
2, 2008, at WK5.
33. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
34. Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
35. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
36. See Abby Goodnough, Rejecting Veto, Vermont Backs Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009, at Al.
37. See Abby Goodnough, New Hampshire Approves Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, June 4, 2009, at A19.
38. See Ian Urbina, Nation's Capital Approves Same-Sex Marriages, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2009, at A26.
39. See Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at Al.
40. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2004).
41. Domestic Partnership Equality Amendment Act of 2006, D.C. Act 16-265,
53 D.C. Reg. 1035 (codified as amended in scattered sections of D.C. CODE),
available at http://www.dccouncil.washington.dc.us/images/00001/
20060113145021.pdf.
42. H.R. 437, 2007 Leg.,
333d Sess. (N.H. 2007), available at
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/legislation/2007/HB0437.html. No new civil unions
may be established on or after January 1, 2011. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457-A:1
(2008).
43. S.
283,
2009 Leg.,
75th Sess.
(Nev.
2009),
available at
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/75th2009/Bills/SB/SB283_EN.pdf.
44. Act of Dec. 21, 2006, ch. 103, 2006 N.J. Laws 975, available at
http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/pensions/pdf/laws/chapt103.pdf.
45. Oregon Family Fairness Act, H.R. 2007, 74th Leg. Sess. (Or. 2007).
46. Act of Dec. 2, 2009, ch. 521, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 3065.
47. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-4(3) (1997) (noting that the parties must be
'legally prohibited from marrying one another"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-29 (West
2009); N.H. H.R. 437; Or. H.R. 2007 § 3(1).
48. In California and Washington, opposite-sex domestic partners may register
if at least one of the partners is over the age of sixty-two. CAL. FAM. CODE §
297(b)(6)(B) (West 2004); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.60.030 (2007).
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instances has there been an equality of recognition of the rights of
same-sex and opposite-sex nonmarital partners. 49 Here I must
mention an important instance of such equal recognition: the
promulgation in 2002 of the Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution by the American Law Institute (ALI).50 The chief
reporter of the Principles, Professor Ira Mark Ellman, has
summarized the ALI's approach to domestic partners as follows:
[The] treatment of domestic partners does not adopt the
contractual approach most often associated with the California
Supreme Court's decision in Marvin v. Marvin, but instead
follows more recent trends that treat persons as having
entered a relationship with legal significance when they live
together and share a life together for a sufficient period of
time.... Under the formulation adopted by the Institute,
parties who live together with their common child, for the
required minimum time period, are deemed domestic partners.
The required time period is left for the adopting jurisdiction to
choose, but the commentary suggests that a two-year period
would be reasonable. Unrelated parties who do not have a
common child are presumed to be domestic partners if they
share a common household for a separately-established
minimum period, the commentary suggesting a three-year
period as a reasonable choice. ... Parties may also be treated

as domestic partners if one of them shows that they shared a
common household and a life together for a 'significant period
of time,' even if that time is less than the minimum periods set
in the other provisions. Once parties are considered domestic
partners, the dissolution of their relationship triggers property
and compensatory payment.., remedies that overlap almost
51
entirely with those available at the dissolution of marriage.
The Principlescarries the reputational authority of the ALI, but it
is not law. The prime statutory example in American law of equal
recognition of same-sex and opposite-sex partnerships in a way
that confers most or all of the state-based 52 rights of marriage 53 on
49. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 1, § 6.02 cmt. a.
50. Id. § 6.02.
51. Ira Mark Ellman, Abstract of ALI FAMILY LAW REPORT (2000), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=241418.
52. See Memorandum from Barry R. Bedrick, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Office of the
Gen. Counsel, to the Honorable Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary
(Jan. 31, 1997).
53. Some statutes confer limited rights equally on same-sex and opposite-sex
couples. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710 (2009) (providing some
inheritance rights for same-sex and opposite-sex domestic partners who have
registered with the state and who meet the statutory definition of "2 unmarried
adults who are domiciled together under long-term arrangements that evidence a
commitment to remain responsible indefinitely for each other's welfare"). Maine's
legislation gives a surviving registered domestic partner the spousal share of the
decedent's intestate estate, but it does not provide protection against intentional or
unintentional disinheritance. Id. tit. 18-A, § 2-102. See also Colorado Designated
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partnership

legislation

recently enacted in Nevada. 54 Under the Nevada legislation, two
competent adults may register as domestic partners if the adults
share a common residence, are not impermissibly related by blood,
and are neither married nor a member of another domestic
partnership. Once registered, the partners "have the same rights,
protections and benefits, and are subject to the same
responsibilities, obligations and duties under law... as are
55
granted to and imposed upon spouses."
Legislatures outside the United States have been quicker to
recognize and support opposite-sex and same-sex unmarried
cohabitants alike, though this equality is still more the exception
than the rule. In the majority of Western European countries, for
example, domestic partnership legislation applies only to
cohabitants of the same sex. 56 The exceptions, providing equal

protections to same-sex and opposite-sex cohabitants, include
Andorra, Belgium, Croatia, France, Hungary, Luxembourg, the
57
Netherlands, and some of the Spanish autonomous communities.
Of particular interest are the statutes in the Netherlands and
Belgium, which provide marriage equality and equal access to
domestic partnership. 58 Both statutes are open to same-sex and
opposite-sex couples. 59 Cohabitants can choose which status they
wish, thereby tailoring to the individual case the appropriate level
of legal recognition and protection.

Beneficiary Agreement Act, ch. 107, 2009 Colo. Sess. Laws 428 (addressing
designated beneficiary agreements).
54. 2009 Nev. Stat. 393. In Washington, D.C., opposite-sex and same-sex
domestic partners also enjoy many, if not all, of the state-based rights and
responsibilities of marriage. Domestic Partnership Equality Amendment Act of
2006, D.C. Act 16-265, 53 D.C. Reg. 1035 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of D.C. CODE), availableat http://www.dccouncil.washington.dc.us/images/00001/

20060113145021.pdf. It is hard to gauge the status of the law in Washington, D.C.,
because the process has been incremental and piecemeal.
55. 2009 Nev. Stat. 393, § 7.
56. Examples of Western European countries with domestic partnership
legislation covering only same-sex couples include Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Iceland, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. See ILGA Europe,
Marriage and Partnership Rights for Same-Sex Partners: Country-By-Country,
http://www.ilga-europe.org/europe/issuesthemes/families/
recognition of relationships/legislation andcaselaw/marriage-and-partnershipr
ightsIfor same sex partnerscountry_bycountry (last visited Mar. 17, 2010). See
also LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX COUPLES IN EUROPE (Katharina Boele-

Woelki & Angelika Fuchs eds., 2003).
57. See ILGA Europe, supra note 56. See also LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAMESEX COUPLES IN EUROPE, supra note 56.
58. See ILGA Europe, supra note 56.
59. Id.
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This idea, of providing a menu of multiple options, has much
to commend it. Within a set of defined categories, 60 partners could
tailor the level of recognition and protection to their particular
needs and wishes. 61 Marriage could still be the highest and
strongest relationship, with other forms of relationship recognition
at other points on the spectrum.
More relationship options should be offered than are provided
in current law. Even the European legislation can fail to capture
the full picture of cohabitation, because some cohabitants share
lives of deep mutual care and concern without being partners in
the conventional romantic sense. Two elderly sisters, for example,
could not register as partners in the Netherlands because they are
impermissibly related. 62 Relatives may register as cohabitants in
Belgium, though the Belgian statute provides a lower level of
63
rights and protections than the Dutch statute.
The flexibility I seek in the law is not entirely an innovation.
In medieval and early modern Mediterranean Europe, there was a
legal institution known in French as the affrairement-in modern
French, affrrement-translated into English literally as
"brotherment. 64 The parties to a contract of affr6rement pledged to
have "one house, one hearth, and one purse."6 5 Recent archival
research in southern France has discovered many instances of
affr~rements, sometimes between biological brothers, but
sometimes between other pairs of relatives-for example, between
brothers-in-law, or between first cousins. 66 There are also many

60. On the benefits of the numerus clausus principle in another context, see
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000).
61. As I have written elsewhere, there are two principal methods that a
legislative reform proposal might use to identify couples as being in a domestic
partnership (or other status short of marriage): self-identification and statutory
identification. See Thomas P. Gallanis, Default Rules, Mandatory Rules, and the
Movement for Same-Sex Equality, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1513, 1525 (1999). The best
approach uses both techniques; it "combines self-identification techniques [such as
registering with a state agency] with a multiple-factor description [to enable the
inclusion of couples despite a failure to register]." Thomas P. Gallanis, Inheritance
Rights for Domestic Partners,79 TUL. L. REV. 55, 84 (2004).
62. BURGERLIJK WETBOEK art. 1:41 (Neth.). See Wendy M. Schrama, Registered
Partnershipin the Netherlands, 13 INT'L J.L. POL'Y & FAM. 315, 319 (1999).
63. See LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX COUPLES IN EUROPE, supra note 56,
at 231-43.
64. See Allan A. Tulchin, Same-Sex Couples Creating Households in Old Regime
France: The Uses of the Affr~rement, 79 J. MOD. HIST. 613, 614 (2007).
65. Id. at 614.
66. Id. at 618, 635-36, 625.
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surviving contracts of affr~rement between nonrelatives. 67 Some of
these seem to have been motivated by deep regard and friendship,
though there are a few that look very much like same-sex unions.
The point to notice is that the affr~rement "provided the legal
foundation for non-nuclear households of many types."68 This kind
of flexibility-adapted for the modern age-would be a welcome
addition to our family law.

II. Portability
The second normative claim of this Essay is that, given the
mobility of the U.S. population from one state to another, the legal
structures that recognize and support the flexible family should be
portable across state lines for parties who change their state of
domicile.
The American family is on the move. 69 A recently-published
study, based on data from the U.S. Census, shows that millions of
Americans are moving across state lines each year, and the
numbers are growing. 70 The percentage of Americans moving from
one state to another "has risen every year this decade:" the
percentage stood at 2.2 in 2003, 2.5 in 2005, and 2.7 in 2006.71
This 2.7 percent represents eight million Americans moving across
72
state lines in just one year.
Most Americans who are married are able to take their
family arrangements with them from state to state. The marriage
of a man and a woman in one state will, in most circumstances, be
73
valid and recognized as a marriage in every other state.
The same is not true of same-sex marriages, civil unions,
domestic partnerships, or other similar designations. 74 These

67. Id. at 625-26.
68. Id. at 614.
69. This section of the Essay draws on Thomas P. Gallanis, Frontiers of
Succession, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 419 (2008).
70. See Haya El Nasser & Paul Overberg, Millions More Are Changing States,
USA TODAY, Nov. 30, 2007, at IA.

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971) ("A

marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was
contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong
public policy of another state which had the most significant relationship to the
spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage.").
74. For a chart identifying states offering some relationship recognition to
same-sex couples,
RECOGNITION FOR

see NAVL GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, RELATIONSHIP
SAME-SEx COUPLES IN THE U.S. 1 (2009), available at

http:l/thetaskforce.orgldownloadslreports/issue-maps/rel-recogl 1l_4_09.pdf.
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arrangements are either not portable at all beyond the relevant
state's borders or portable only to a limited number of
destinations.7 5 This lack of interstate recognition creates
substantial difficulties for couples changing their domicile.
The policy reason offered for non-recognition of another
state's marriage or domestic partnership is that the state does not
want to legalize the marriage or partnership arrangement. But
does interstate recognition require intrastate legalization? The
Uniform Law Commission does not view it this way. Consider the
following Legislative Note to Article II of the Uniform Probate
Code:
States that do not recognize ... relationships between
unmarried individuals, or marriages between same-sex
partners, are urged to consider whether to recognize the
spousal-type rights that partners acquired under the law of
another jurisdiction in which the relationship was
formed .... Doing so would not be the equivalent of
recognizing such relationships in this state but simply
allowing those who move to ... this76state to retain the rights
they previously acquired elsewhere.
This is precisely the point: our law should do more to ensure that
the legal structures that recognize and support the flexible family
are portable across state lines when there has been a change of
domicile.
III. Three Dimensions
The third normative claim of this Essay is that American law
not only should address the bilateral, or two-dimensional, rights
and obligations of unmarried cohabitants to each other but also
should protect the flexible family in all three dimensions,
including against outsiders.
Marriage offers a range of such three-dimensional legal
protections for the spouses and their property. For present
purposes, three examples will suffice. The first example is both the
oldest and the most straightforward of the three: tenancy by the

75. Maryland and New York are rare examples of states willing to recognize
same-sex marriages performed elsewhere. 95 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 3 (2010)
(providing the opinion of the Maryland Attorney General that same-sex marriages
validly performed in other jurisdictions are recognized in Maryland); Martinez v.
County of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (holding that New York
must recognize a marriage contracted in Canada by a same-sex couple); see also
Phred Dvorak, Why Just One Wedding Isn't Enough for Some Gay Couples, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 30, 2008, at Al.
76. UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, prefatory note (2008).

2010]

The Flexible Family

entirety. 77 Available in twenty-four states and the District of
Columbia, 78 tenancy by the entirety is a concurrent estate existing
between husband and wife. 79 In the majority of jurisdictions
recognizing tenancy by the entirety, the tenancy provides
impenetrable asset protection: during the marriage, one spouse
may not unilaterally pledge the property as collateral, nor may the
property be reached by one spouse's creditors.8 0 The purpose of
this asset-protection feature was explained by the Hawaii
8
Supreme Court in the leading case of Sawada v. Endo: '
When a family can afford to own real property, it becomes
their single most important asset. Encumbered as it usually is
by a first mortgage, the fact remains that so long as it remains
whole during the joint lives of the spouses, it is always
available in its entirety for the benefit and use of the entire
family. Loans for education and other emergency expenses, for
example, may be obtained on the security of the marital
estate .... If we were to select between a public policy
favoring the creditors of one of the spouses and one favoring
the interests of the family unit, we would not hesitate to
82
choose the latter.

To be sure, there are exceptions to the asset protection of a statelaw tenancy by the entirety, particularly where interests of the
federal government are at stake.8 3 But exceptions aside, a married
couple in a majority of the jurisdictions recognizing tenancy by the
entirety can use the tenancy to shield resources for the protection
of the family unit.8 4 Unmarried cohabitants (other than parties to
77. For a recent discussion by a leading scholar, see John V. Orth, In re
Tenancy by the Entirety---MarriedCouples, Common Law Marriages,and Same-Sex
Partners:Orth v. Orth, 85 N.D. L. REV. 287 (2009).
78. See Fred Franke, Asset Protection and Tenancy by the Entirety, 34 ACTEC
J. 210, 222-33 (2009). The twenty-four states are Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware,
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. The
tenancy was also available in Ohio from 1972 to 1985, and tenancies by the entirety
created while the 1972 statute was effective will still be respected. Id. at 230. For a
state-by-state analysis, see id. at 222-33.
79. Id. at 210.
80. Id. at 212. The jurisdictions in which tenancy by the entirety operates as a
complete bar to the creditors of one spouse are Delaware, the District of Columbia,
Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. at 222-33.
81. 561 P.2d 1291 (Haw. 1977).
82. Id. at 1297.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002) (involving a federal tax
lien pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6321); United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343
(6th Cir. 1990) (involving forfeiture of property used in drug offenses pursuant to
21 U.S.C. §§ 853, 881).
84. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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a civil union in Vermont, 85 domestic partners in the District of
Columbia, 86 or reciprocal beneficiaries in Hawaii 87) have no similar
88
protection.
The second example concerns the provisions of federal and
state tax law that favor married couples. There are many
illustrations here, but let me offer three easy ones. First, the
federal estate tax provides an unlimited marital deduction for
property passing at death to the decedent's surviving spouse. 89
Second, the federal gift tax not only has a similarly unlimited
marital deduction, 90 but also allows spouses to act together as
donors, thereby doubling the gift tax annual exclusion. 9 1 In
calendar year 2010, an unmarried person can give $13,000 per
recipient free of tax, while a married person (with the spouse's
consent) can double the tax-free gift to $26,000. Third, the federal
income tax treatment of spouses is dramatically different from the
treatment of unmarried couples. Depending on the facts, there can
be a "marriage penalty" or a "marriage bonus."92 For couples with
93
only one wage-earner, there is definitely a "marriage bonus."
These illustrations come from the realm of federal taxation,
but there are plenty of counterparts in state-level taxation that
fail to treat spouses and unmarried cohabitants alike. A state-law
problem needs only a state-law solution.
With respect to federal taxation, there are different
approaches that could be taken to reduce or eliminate the
disparate tax treatment between spouses and unmarried
cohabitants. One approach, recently advocated by Professor
Patricia Cain, would be for Congress to enact a federal definition
of domestic partnership, and then apply the same rules to
domestic partners so defined as are applied to spouses.9 4 This
federal definition would provide for the uniform treatment across
all fifty states of unmarried cohabitants meeting the federal
definition and would equalize their tax benefits and obligations
85. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(e)(1) (2002 & Supp. 2009).
86. D.C. CODE § 46-601(d) (2009).
87. HAw. REV. STAT. § 509-2 (2006).
88. See Franke, supra note 78, at 211 (discussing marriage as the "fifth unity"
of tenancy by the entirety).
89. 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (2006).
90. Id. § 2523(a).
91. Id. §§ 2503(b), 2513(a).
92. See Dorothy A. Brown, The MarriageBonus/Penalty in Black and White, 65
U. CIN. L. REV. 787, 789-90 (1997).
93. See id. at 788-89.
94. Patricia A. Cain, Taxing FamiliesFairly, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805, 85155 (2008).
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with those of spouses. 95 Another approach, suggested by the work
of Professor Nancy Polikoff, would be to examine "the purposes of
a law"96-here, the Internal Revenue Code (Code)-to determine
which provisions should be reformed to treat spouses akin to
unmarried cohabitants (with the definition of the latter remaining
the province of state law). A third approach would be to piggy-back
on the state recognition of statuses short of marriage-for
example, civil unions in New Jersey, domestic partnerships in
California, and reciprocal beneficiaries in Hawaii-and then
equalize the tax treatment of spouses and persons who meet those
state definitions. 97 Each of these options has merit, though the
third seems the most realistic. It does not depend on a
congressional definition of domestic partnership, for such a
definition is unlikely to happen; and even if it did, a mandatory
federal definition might calcify the law in a way that would be
unresponsive to ongoing developments. Recall that Justice
Brandeis wisely spoke of the "laboratory" of the states. 98 Nor does
the third approach require a provision-by-provision analysis of the
Code. Instead, the third approach-using state law definitions,
then equalizing the treatment-has the virtues of practicality and
equality. The results would not be uniform across the nation, but
the definition of family is traditionally, and rightly, a matter of
state law. 99 A patchwork quilt of relationship recognition would be
acceptable. Indeed, the status quo is a patchwork quilt of its own,
just not sufficiently responsive to the needs of unmarried
cohabitants.
So far, we have examined examples from the law of property
and the law of taxation. The third example concerns the law of
Medicaid. 100 The Medicaid program pays for medical expenses for
the elderly, blind, and disabled. 10 1 To qualify for Medicaid, the
95. See id. at 854-55.
96. NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL
FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 126 (2008).

97. See Cain, supra note 94, at 851 (discussing the possibility of extending the
spousal treatment of "those couples whose relationships are recognized under state
law" to same-sex couples).
98. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
99. See Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 151 (2001).
100. The use of the name 'Medicaid" is not universal. In California, for example,
Medicaid is called Medi-Cal. See Department of Health Care Services, Medi-Cal,
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/serviceslmedi-calfPages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 15,
2010).
Information,
Medicaid
Security
Online,
Social
101. See
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/disabilityresearch/wi/medicaid.htm (last visited Mar.
15, 2010).
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applicant must have low income and few assets. 10 2 Precisely how
low and how few varies from state to state.103 Medicaid was
established by federal law,10 4 but the funding and administration
of the program are jointly federal and state. 0 5 This has resulted in
variations in state benefits and in eligibility requirements. Still,
one can speak in general terms.
There are many provisions of the Medicaid program that are
designed to protect the spouse of the Medicaid applicant. For
instance, an applicant who transfers assets to or for the benefit of
the spouse will not be penalized under the so-called "look-back"
rules that render ineligible an applicant who has transferred
property for the benefit of a third party. 106 To take another
example, consider the applicant who seeks Medicaid in order to
afford to live in a nursing home, but has a spouse who does not
need nursing care. The Medicaid program allows the spouse to
keep the primary residence, which as long as it is occupied by the
spouse is considered an exempt asset-hence not taken into
account.10 7 And beyond the house, the Medicaid program ensures
that the spouse can keep some of the couple's joint assets' 0 8 -and
even some of the applicant's income and resources. 10 9 The aim is to
ensure that the spouse is not left homeless and in poverty. This
concern for the spouse continues even after the Medicaid
recipient's death. 10 Here I refer to the so-called "estate recovery"
whereby the state can recover the cost of Medicaid from the estate
of the deceased recipient."' If the surviving spouse is still residing
in the couple's home, the spouse is allowed to remain there for life,
1 2
thereby postponing recovery.

102. See Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, U.S. Department of Health
& Human Services, Medicaid Eligibility: Overview, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
MedicaidEligibility/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
103. Id.
104. Congress passed the legislation that created Medicaid in 1965. Act of July
30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396,
1396a-v (2006)).
105. Social Security Online, supra note 101.
106. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(c)(2)(A)(i), (c)(2)(B)(i) (2006). Also exempted are assets
transferred by the applicant's spouse to another, for the sole benefit of the spouse.
Id. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(ii).
107. Id. §§ 1382b(a)(1), 1396r-5(c)(5)(A).
108. Id. § 1396r-5(c).
109. Id. §§ 1396r-5(d), (f).
110. Id. § 1396p(b)(2) ("Any adjustment or recovery [from a Medicaid recipient's
estate] ... may be made only after the death of the individual's surviving spouse, if
any... ").
111. Id. § 1396p(b).
112. Id. § 1396p(b)(2). Even after the death of the surviving spouse, the statute
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The Federal Department of Health and Human Services has
made its position clear that the extension of marriage to same-sex
couples under state law does not make the couples "married" for
purposes of the federal funds contributed to state Medicaid
programs. 113 This position derives from the federal definition of
marriage in the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). 114 Phrased
precisely: the Department of Health and Human Services has
informed the Commonwealth of Massachusetts that if the state
determines that an applicant in a same-sex marriage is eligible for
Medicaid but the applicant would not be eligible if single, then
federal funds are not available toward the state's expenditures on
the applicant's behalf.11 5 For this reason, among many others, the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts has filed a lawsuit against the
Department of Health and Human Services and other federal
agencies. 116
The extent to which, under DOMA, the protections typically
given to the opposite-sex spouse of the Medicaid applicant can be
extended to an unmarried partner-for example, in a civil union or
other partnership short of marriage-remains unclear. A state
can, of course, do as it wishes with state funds. But the stumbling
block is that Medicaid is a federal-state partnership, and the
federal financial participation is significant. 117 The current law is
regrettably unclear about whether DOMA prevents the use of
federal funds when a state wishes to treat a Medicaid applicant in
a civil union or with a domestic partner as if the applicant had a
spouse.
provides some protections for children and siblings of the deceased Medicaid
recipient. Id.
113. Letter from Charlotte S. Yeh, Reg'l Adm'r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs., Dep't of Health & Human Servs, to Kristen Reasoner Apgar, Gen. Counsel,
Commonwealth of Mass. (May 28, 2004), available at http://www.lgbtbar.org/
annualCLEmaterials/5B/HHSmedicaidDOMAletter.pdf ("In short, the DOMA
does not give the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services... the discretion to
recognize same-sex marriage for purposes of the Federal portion of Medicaid.").
114. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) ("[T]he word 'marriage' means only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse'
refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.").
115. Letter from Charlotte S. Yeh to Kristen Reasoner Apgar, supra note 113, at
2.
116. See Complaint at 46-62, Commonwealth v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human
Servs., No. 1:09-CV-11156-JLT (D. Mass. July 8, 2009) (relating to the state's
Medicaid program, known as MassHealth). See generally Abby Goodnough, State
Suit Challenges U.S. Defense of Marriage Act, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2009, at A20
(discussing the details of the lawsuit).
117. Complaint, supra note 116, at 60 ('"The Commonwealth has estimated that
the annual amount of [federal financial participation] that is unavailable due to
DOMA is $2.37 million.").
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This Essay's normative argument looks beyond the current
law. Whether we are speaking about the use of only state funds or
additionally federal funds, the right thing for states to do is to
provide Medicaid protections for unmarried cohabitants, so that
the cohabitant not applying for Medicaid can remain in the
common residence and can continue to have appropriate resources
and income.
Conclusion
This Essay advances three normative claims. First,
nonmarital cohabitation should be more fully recognized and
supported by American law. Second, given the mobility of our
population from one state to another, the legal structures that
recognize and support the flexible family should be portable across
state lines for parties who change their state of domicile. Third,
American law not only should address the bilateral rights and
obligations of unmarried cohabitants to each other but also should
protect the flexible family against third parties, such as creditors
and taxing and welfare authorities.
Leo Tolstoy was quite wrong that "[h]appy families are all
alike." 118 The households of unmarried cohabitants are formed for
many different reasons. The law should recognize and protect the
different kinds of family-not in an "infinite variety," 119 to borrow
William Shakespeare's phrase, 120 but much more flexibly than
under the current regime, and in all three dimensions.

118. LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 3 (Leonard J. Kent & Nina Berberova eds.,
Constance Garnett trans., Modern Library paperback ed. 2000) (1877).
119. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
120. "Age cannot wither her, nor custome stale / Her infinite variety ..
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDIE OF ANTHONIE, AND CLEOPATRA act 2, sc. 2,

ll. 235-36 (M.R. Ridley ed,, Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1954) (1623).

